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Summary
Confabulation is a mysterious adjunct of amnesia. It remains
unexplained why some patients invent untrue stories in
response to questions (provoked confabulations) or even
spontaneously with no apparent motivation (spontaneous
confabulations). Hypothesized mechanisms range from a
desire to fill gaps in memory to a loss of the temporal context
in memory. We examined the mechanisms of confabulations in
16 amnesic patients. Patients were classified as spontaneous
confabulators if they ever acted according to their confabula-
tions. Provoked confabulations were measured as the number
of intrusions in a verbal learning test. We found a double
dissociation between the two types of confabulations, indicat-
ing that they represent different disorders rather than different
degrees of the same disorder. Confabulating patients did not
show an increased tendency to fill gaps in memory as
measured by the number of fake questions concerning non-
existent items that they answered. Neither type of confabula-
tion correlated with a failure to store new information as
gauged with recognition tasks; pure information storage was
even found to be normal in some patients. However, we found
a positive correlation between several measures of verbal
learning and verbal fluency with provoked, but not spon-
taneous, confabulations. In contrast, spontaneous, but not
provoked, confabulations were associated with an inability
to recognize the temporal order of stored information as
measured by the comparison of two runs of a continuous
recognition task. We suggest that provoked confabulations
depend on an amnesic subject's search in his deficient
memory and are the trade-off for increased item recollection.
Spontaneous confabulations appear to be based on a failure
to recognize the temporal order of stored information,
resulting in erroneous recollection of elements of memory
that do not belong together.
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Introduction
Confabulations have been defined as 'falsification of
memory occurring in clear consciousness in association with
an organically derived amnesia' (Berlyne, 1972). Many
researchers distinguished between spontaneous (sustained,
wide-ranging, grandiose, obvious in everyday conversation)
and provoked (by questions probing memory) confabulations
(Berlyne, 1972). It is not clear whether these types of
confabulations represent different disorders (Van der Horst,
1932; Kopelman, 1987) or different degrees of a common
disorder with spontaneous confabulations being the more
severe type (Kapur and Coughlan, 1980; DeLuca and
Cicerons, 1991; Dalla Barba, 1993; Fischer el ai, 1995).
Several mechanisms of confabulations have been proposed,
(i) Confabulations directly result from amnesia (Berlyne,
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1972; American Psychiatric Association, 1994); but the
severity of amnesia does not correlate with confabulations
(Mercer et al., 1977; Kapur and Coughlan, 1980). (ii)
Confabulations reflect a desire to fill gaps in memory (Van
der Horst, 1932; American Psychiatric Association, 1994);
albeit plausible, this mechanism has never been formally
explored, (iii) Confabulations arise from the combination of
amnesia with a frontal dysexecutive syndrome (Mercer et al.,
1977; Stuss et al., 1978; Shapiro et al., 1981; Kopelman,
1987; Dalla Barba, 1993; DeLuca, 1993; Fischer et al., 1995):
but the dysexecutive syndrome represents a broad class of
cognitive failures following prefrontal damage or
disconnection (Sandson et al., 1991), thus, this notion does
not disclose the specific mechanism of confabulations.
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(iv) Confabulations reflect a loss of the temporal label
of stored information. This mechanism was proposed for
spontaneous confabulations a long time ago (Van der Horst,
1932) with no evidence, however, to support it.
We have recently studied a patient who, after sustaining
an infarct of the right inferior capsular genu, could not
recall previously learned information but produced abundant
confabulations both spontaneously and in response to
questions (Schnider et al., 1996). In a series of experiments
we demonstrated that she could store novel information
normally, but failed to store the temporal order of information
acquisition. This study thus indicated that confabulations
were based on a failure to label new information temporally
rather than a failure to store the information per se. The
present study was undertaken in search of a common
mechanism of confabulations irrespective of aetiology. In
particular, we endeavoured to answer the following questions,
(i) Are provoked and spontaneous confabulations different
disorders or different degrees of the same disorder? (ii) Are
confabulations associated with a desire to fill gaps in memory?
(iii) Are confabulations dependent on an inability to store
new information? (iv) Are confabulations due to a failure to
recognize the temporal order of stored information?
Patients and methods
Sixteen patients with severe amnesia were asked to participate
in the study. The diagnosis of amnesia was based on
behavioural observation (all patients were hospitalized in our
Division for Neuropsychological Rehabilitation at the time
of the study) and formal memory tests. Data reported here
from each patient were gathered within 1 week. Because all
spontaneously confabulating patients {see definition below)
had a delayed free recall =£4 in the California Verbal Learning
test (CVLT; Delis, 1987) only patients with equally impaired
recall were finally included in the study. Inclusion criteria
thus were: (i) delayed free recall =£4 in the CVLT (Delis,
1987); (ii) digit span 3=5; (iii) no cognitive failure preventing
participation in the experiments (e.g. aphasia, agnosia).
Clinical characteristics and neuroradiological findings are
listed in Table 1. Table 1 includes extended results of the
CVLT, the late recall of the complex figure of Rey (1941)
and performance on several frontal lobe tasks: verbal fluency
(Thurstone and Thurstone, 1963), design fluency (Regard
et al., 1982) and colour-word interference (Stroop, 1935).
All patients and control subjects gave informed consent to
participate in this study.
Classification of confabulations
In previous studies authors often included features such as
'sustained, wide-ranging and grandiose' (Berlyne, 1972) or
'elaborate, extended' (Fisher et al., 1995) in their definition
of spontaneous confabulations, or classified 'severe'
confabulations as spontaneous and 'moderate' confabulations
as provoked (DeLuca and Cicerone, 1991). Such descriptions
are arbitrary and are not necessarily correlated with the core
feature of the two types of confabulations, namely, provoked
or spontaneous (Kopelman, 1987). We distinguished between
confabulations without implying any difference in severity
or quality other than their being provoked or spontaneous.
Provoked confabulations were measured as the total
number of intrusions in the CVLT (Delis et al., 1987), i.e.
the number of false words produced when recalling the word
list. Healthy subjects produce very few intrusions in this test:
100 healthy controls, aged 44± 16 years (19-79 years), made
11.7 (0-8, median 0.5) intrusions in all runs of this test (J.
Ilmberger, unpublished data).
Spontaneous confabulations are more difficult to establish
because an examiner can never be sure that he did not
provoke a confabulation in some way. Confabulations that a
patient produces truly spontaneously with no external trigger
(supervision alone might be such a trigger) cannot be reliably
quantified. For the purpose of this study we attempted to
establish definitely the presence of, rather than to quantify,
spontaneous confabulations. Based on observations by the
examiners, other physicians and the nursing staff patients
were classified as 'spontaneous confabulators' or 'other
amnesic subjects'. A patient qualified as a 'spontaneous
confabulator' if he ever acted upon his self-generated
confabulations, a criterion which had been proposed by
Berlyne (1972). For example, a patient explaining that he
intended to give a speech to the parliament qualified as a
spontaneous confabulator only if he ever took an active
measure, e.g. packed his suitcase 'to go to the parliament'.
Six patients qualified as spontaneous confabulators (Table 1).
It should be understood that this classification concerned
only the presence or absence of spontaneous confabulations.
Because spontaneous confabulations were not quantified,
their mechanisms were examined by comparing spontaneous
confabulators and other amnesic subjects. Irrespective of
their producing spontaneous confabulations, all patients'
production of provoked confabulations was measured.
Because provoked confabulations were quantified, their
mechanisms were examined with correlation analysis.
Cases
Patient 1 (spontaneous confabulator, no provoked
confabulations)
This 58-year-old woman suffered subarachnoid haemorrhage
from an anterior communicating artery aneurysm, which was
clipped the next day. Postoperatively, she was confused and
a severe memory disturbance was noted. A CT scan revealed
a hypodense area involving the septum verum and the
substantia innominata on both sides. She was transferred to
our Neuropsychological Rehabilitation unit after 4 weeks.
Memory testing revealed severe amnesia characterized by
very deficient free recall and comparably preserved
recognition (see Table 1 for neuropsychological results). She
did not confabulate at all in memory tests and was usually
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Table 1 Patient characteristics
Patient/
sex/age
l/F/58
2/M/45
3/M/52
4/F/62
5/M/45
6/M/67
7/M/58
8/M/72
9/F/53
10/M/55
ll/M/57
12/F/43
13/F/18
I4/M/48
I5/M/21
I6/F/42
Aetiology*
SAH (ACoA
aneurysm)
Trauma
Trauma
Infarction
Trauma (frontal
contusions)
Olfactory
SAH (ACoA
aneurysm)
SAH (ACoA
aneurysm)
SAH, spasms
(right PCoA
aneurysm)
Wernicke-
Korsakoff synd.
Left paramedian
thalamic infarct
Multiple infarcts
Trauma
Cardiac arrest
Trauma
Trauma
(shearing injury)
Lesion sitef
Orbitofrontal
Left insula. right
basal forebrain
Orbitofrontal
Right capsular
genu
Bi frontal,
extensive
Orbitofrontal
meningioma
Orbitofrontal
Orbitofrontal
Right fronto-
parietal
(Medial
thalamus)
Left medial
thalamus
Primarily right
frontal
Medial temporal,
right insula
(Hippocampus)
Primarily
mesencephalon
(Primarily
mesencephalon)
Days
after
onset
24
45
14
210
87
28
79
65
136
150
32
34
270
25
66
69
CVLT
Run 5
5
6
3
9
3
2
3
4
5
7
5
4
4
5
7
11
CVLT
Delayed
recall
0
2
0
4
0
0
0
0
0
1
0
0
0
0
3
4
CVLT
Recogn.
Hits-FP*
14-19
11-4
8-15
12-7
11-15
N/A
16-9
N/A
10-11
10-3
14-14
14-3
12-14
7-10
14-2
16-10
CVLT
Intrusions
sions
0
26
3
65
12
15
3
5
11
10
9
20
4
1
19
37
Rey
Figure
recall
0
10
15
9
0
11
6
11
N/A
6
11
8.5
2
4.5
9
14.5
Verbal
fluency
+ + +
+ +
+ +
OK
+ + +
+ + +
+ + +
+
OK
+ +
+ + +
+ +
+ +
+ +
+
OK
Design
fluency
+ + +
+ +
OK
+
+ +
OK
+ + +
+ + +
N/A
+ +
+ + +
OK
+ +
N/A
+
OK
Colour-
word
interf.
+ +
+
+
+
N/A
+
OK
OK
N/A
+ + +
+ + +
+ + +
OK
+
OK
OK
Associated
findings
Roaming
Anosmia, right
oculomotor
palsy
Left neglect
and hemiplegia
Talkativeness,
distractability
Gait ataxia
Depression
Right
hemiparesis
Diplopia, gait
ataxia
Patient characteristics: the first six patients are spontaneous confabulators listed according to our clinical impression of the severity of confabulations
(No. 1, severest). Provoked confabulations are listed as 'CVLT: intrusions' (controls, 1.0±1.7) *Aetiology: SAH = subarachnoid haemorrhage; ACoA =
anterior communicating artery; PCoA= posterior communicating artery. ^Lesion sites are indicated as evident on CT or MRI scans or, in brackets, as presumed
(the latter cases had normal MRls). 'Orbitofrontal' designates lesions of the orbitofrontal cortex or basal forebrain. *Recognition indicated as hits - false
positives (FP). Impairment of frontal executive functions: + + + , severe; + + , moderate; +, mild. N/A = data not available.
astonished to hear that she had actually learned a list of
words when asked for recall. She was active throughout the
day but appeared to forget any instruction or plans told to
her by the personnel. She confused people on the ward even
after several weeks and never maintained temporal or spatial
orientation. She did not have any insight into her memory
failure. She confabulated floridly in conversation about
plans she had for the day and about her stay in our house
(she did not think that she was in a hospital); she thought
she had several rooms there and would vividly explain how
she had arranged them. She often acted according to her
confabulations: she would step into another patient's room
saying that it was her living room; she walked away from a
test session telling the examiner that she had to watch her
children who were playing on the terrace (all her children
were adults by the time); she got up in the morning, packed
her suitcase and went to a nurse to say goodbye, explaining
that she had to look after her little boy who had not been
fed yet. She regularly got upset when told that her children
were grown up. Her amnesia, confabulations and
disorientation did not improve and she was transferred to a
closed unit after 4 months. This patient qualified as a
'spontaneous confabulator' because she spontaneously acted
upon her confabulations, while she did not produce provoked
confabulations according to our criteria.
Patient 2 (spontaneous confabulator also
producing provoked confabulations)
This 45-year-old man suffered traumatic brain injury in an
accident with his motorcycle. He remained unconscious for
several hours. Repeated CT scans in the next days showed
several haemorrhagic lesions, most notably in the right basal
forebrain, beneath the left anterior insular cortex and in the
rostral and posterior portion of the corpus callosum. He was
transferred to our rehabilitation unit after 2 weeks. After an
initial confusional period, his attention improved. He walked
around on the ward, chatted with visitors and was considered
a charming man. He was disoriented in time and place. The
nurses noted that he was very forgetful about whatever
they told him. Neuropsychological testing confirmed severe
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• Spontaneous confabulators
• Other amnestic patients
1 14 3 7 13 8 6 11 10 9 5 15 12 2 16 4
Patient no.
Fig. 1 Total number of intrusions in all runs of the CVLT
(Delis el al., 1987) as a quantitative measure of provoked
confabulations. Patient numbers refer to Table 1. The dashed line
in the lower left indicates the (mean+ 2 SDs) number of
intrusions produced by 100 healthy controls.
amnesia. In tests of free recall he produced abundant
confabulations (see Fig. 1) and appeared convinced that these
words had actually been presented before. In conversation,
he would tell true stories (confirmed by relatives) and entirely
invented stories, which mostly related to his normal pastimes.
He occasionally acted according to his confabulations. For
example, he went to a physician's office and asked if he
could use the telephone to arrange this afternoon's deer hunt
with his friends. On another occasion he went to a physician
to tell him that he was deeply concerned that he might not
get a leave from military duties the next day. Although his
confabulations did not have any 'grandiose' or 'elaborate'
quality, the patient was classified as a 'spontaneous
confabulator' because he occasionally acted according to his
confabulations. Additionally, he produced many provoked
confabulations in memory tests.
Patient 9 (provoked confabulations, no
spontaneous confabulations)
This 53-year-old woman with a history of heavy alcohol
consumption suffered subarachnoid haemorrhage from a right
posterior communicating artery aneurysm, which was clipped.
Postoperatively, spasms in the distribution of the right anterior
and middle cerebral artery occurred, resulting in an infarct
involving the right dorsolateral frontal and parietal lobe. CT
additionally showed moderate cortical atrophy. On clinical
examination, she had left hemiplegia and hemispatial neglect
but no hemianopia. There was severe amnesia evident in
everyday behaviour and on formal testing; she would
regularly forget instructions by the personnel and would not
know who had visited her. She was unconcerned about her
memory failures and would play down any allusion to her
bad memory. When asked questions concerning orientation
she would not know the year and would fabricate a story to
explain why the hospital had to be in another city than it
actually was. When asked about her plans for the day, she
would invent unrealistic activities, although it was never
evident from her behaviour whether she actually believed
what she said. However bizarre these stories were, she
produced them only in response to questions and she never
took any active measure to put her confabulated plans into
effect. She was thus classified as an 'other amnesic patient'.
Patient 16 (massive provoked confabulations, no
spontaneous confabulations)
This 42-year-old woman suffered a shearing injury of the
brain when she was hit by a car. She was unconscious for
some minutes. CT scan and MRI were normal. She had
diplopia due to discrete left trochlear paresis (she preferred
to have one eye covered for several weeks) and marked gait
ataxia. She was fully oriented and was soon independent in
her daily activities but she was very forgetful. In memory
tests she achieved severely deficient scores both in free recall
and in recognition tasks (many false positives). In free recall,
she produced abundant confabulations which could mostly
be traced back to items occurring in other tests, sometimes
even tests that had taken place some days before. She never
confabulated in conversation and never acted on any false
beliefs. She was thus classified as an 'other amnesic patient'.
Experiment 1: filling gaps in memory
A desire to fill gaps in memory is a common interpretation
of confabulations. Van der Horst (1932) introduced the term
'confabulations out of embarrassment' to designate what is
now called provoked confabulations. He thus implied that
patients who produce provoked confabulations have a sense
of memory failure, but he left open the question as to whether
confabulations represented a conscious or unconscious
defence mechanism against embarrassment. DSM-IV
(American Psychiatric Association, 1994), which does not
distinguish between different forms of confabulations,
assumes that confabulations are 'recitations of imaginary
events to fill gaps in memory' (p. 157). We tested the
tendency to fill gaps in memory with an experiment related
to the test of suggestibility of Mercer et al. (1977). They
asked patients a series of very difficult questions, to which
most controls would respond i don't know'. In a second
session, patients were again asked the questions to which
they had previously responded 'I don't know' with the
suggestive remark by the examiner that the patient had
actually answered the question in the first run but that the
examiner had forgotten to write down the answer. Mercer
et dl. (1977) assumed that the patients really did not know
the answer to these questions. They found no correlation
between confabulations and the number of answered
questions.
Our experiment was different in two main respects: (i) we
did not make assumptions about a subject's knowledge about
an item; rather we ensured that a subject had got a 'gap in
memory' for the requested item; (ii) patients were not
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specifically motivated to invent a response to questions to
which they did not know the answer.
We composed a questionnaire containing questions about
existing items and fake questions about items that do not
exist. For the latter items, subjects had to have a 'gap in
memory'. The number of answered fake questions was
used to measure the tendency to fill gaps in memory. The
questionnaire comprised 30 questions: 15 questions concerned
existing items, namely, five questions for each of three
categories: famous personalities ('Who is Prince Charles?');
places ('Where is Los Angeles?) and relatively rare words
('What is a gazelle?'). Fifteen questions concerned non-
existent items from the same three categories, e.g. 'Who is
Princess Lolita?', 'Where is Premont?', 'What is a water-
cove?'. Patients were told by the examiner: 'I will ask you
a number of questions. Answer them as well as you can'. The
questionnaire was not given to one spontaneous confabulator
(Patient 5). Twelve age- and education-matched control
subjects were also given the questionnaire.
Experiment 2: information storage failure
With this experiment we investigated whether confabulations
required an impairment of the capacity to store new
information, i.e, whether patients had to have a 'gap in
memory'. Tests of free recall, on which all our patients failed,
are inappropriate to test pure information storage because
they demand, in addition to information storage, additional
cognitive steps, e.g. an active search in memory. Pure
information storage is best represented by recognition tasks,
which probe familiarity with previously met stimuli (Lezak,
1983). We used three continuous recognition tests with
different types of stimuli: meaningful designs, nonsense
geometric designs, and nonwords. In this type of task, subjects
are shown a series of items, some of which (the target items)
are repeatedly shown during the test, others (the distracter
items) are presented only once. Such a task depends on long-
term information storage if the number of items shown
between subsequent presentations of a target item is beyond
the capacity of the short-term memory, which is normally
about six items (Hurst and Volpe, 1982; Sturm and Willmes,
1995). In the tasks used in this experiment, the average
number of items between subsequent target presentations
was 20.
We used different stimulus types because we suspected
that confabulating patients might have particular difficulties
with meaningful stimuli. The intrusions that the initial patient
(Number 4) produced in memory tests were either items
from previous tasks or semantically related to the stimuli
which had actually been presented in the test. In continuous
recognition tests involving nonwords and nonsense designs,
i.e. stimuli with which she could not have an a priori sense
of familiarity, her performance was normal. Hence the use
of meaningful stimuli, which lend themselves to interference
by previous experience, and meaningless stimuli, which are
mandatorily novel.
The recognition tasks involving nonwords and nonsense
designs were provided by Sturm and Willmes (1995). The
meaningful designs recognition task was composed of pictures
from Snodgrass and Vanderwart (1980). All three tasks had
a similar design: they consisted of 120 stimuli, which were
(unrecognizably for the test subject) composed of six series
with 20 stimuli each. Each series contained eight stimuli that
were repeated in all six series (i.e. they recurred five times)
and 12 stimuli that were presented only once. Thus the tests
contained 40 target items and 80 distracters, yielding a
maximum score of 40 (40 hits, no false positive alarms). All
stimuli were scanned into a Macintosh computer and
presented for 2 s with an interstimulus interval of 0.7 s.
Subjects were requested to answer for each stimulus the
question: 'Have you already seen precisely this picture (or
word) in this run?'. The examiner pressed the answer key
on the computer. For the nonwords and nonsense designs
recognition tasks, normal values from 450 healthy subjects
were provided by Sturm and Willmes (1995). For the
meaningful designs recognition test, control values were
obtained from 10 age- and education-matched healthy
subjects.
Experiment 3: temporal order recognition
failure
In this experiment, we investigated whether confabulations
were associated with a failure to recognize the temporal order
of stored information. This capacity is difficult to test in
amnesic subjects, however, because they fail to recall the
information whose temporal label one intends to investigate.
A common method to test memory for the temporal order of
information acquisition requires patients to learn two lists of
information some time apart. Then recognition of the target
items is tested. Upon correct recognition of an item, the
patient has to decide whether the item was in the first or
second list (Squire et al., 1981; Hurst and Volpe, 1982;
Parkin and Hunkin, 1993). Such a task demands explicit
recall of the temporal order of information presentation
and thus risks underestimation of stored temporal order
information.
We devised an experiment to test knowledge about the
temporal order of information acquisition without demanding
explicit knowledge of it. Because such a test requires that
information has actually been stored, the easiest available
memory task was used: the recognition test involving
meaningful designs (Experiment 2). All amnesic patients had
performed far above chance in this test [P < 0.01, a" > 1.96,
determined with signal detection theory (Brophy, 1986)]. To
probe temporal order recognition of stored information,
subjects were again tested with the meaningful designs
recognition task of Experiment 2 1 h after the first run. For
the second run, the eight target items from the first run had
been replaced by items that had been distracters in the first
run. The eight target items from the first run were now
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among the distracters. All other parameters were identical to
the first run. Subjects were instructed that they 'should forget'
that they had already had a similar test and that they should
only indicate the recurrence of an item in this very test run.
The idea behind the experiment was that a subject's false
feeling that an item, which had actually been presented only
in the first run so far, had already been presented in the
second run (i.e. a false-positive alarm in the second run) was
based on a failure to distinguish between the item's previous
occurrence in the first rather than the second run (irrespective
of whether it had been a target or a distracter in the first
run); i.e. an increase of false-positive responses in the second
run over the first run was presumed to indicate a temporal
order recognition problem. In order to account for overall
recognition performance and a tendency to say 'yes' rather
than 'no' in case of uncertainty, the false-positive rate rather
than the number of false-positives was analysed. Thus, the
temporal order recognition failure was calculated as
(FP2/hits2) - (FP,/hitSi)
with FP| 2 = false-positive alarms in run]
 2 and hitS] 2 = true-
positive alarms (hits) in run]
 2.
Results
Provoked versus spontaneous confabulations
As Fig. 1 shows, 11 patients produced more intrusions than
normal controls (mean+2 SDs). If spontaneous con-
fabulations simply represented the more severe form of
confabulations, spontaneous confabulators should produce
more provoked confabulations than other amnesic subjects.
As Fig. 1 shows, this was not the case: spontaneous
confabulators' production of provoked confabulations
(intrusions) did not differ from the other amnesic subjects
(Mann-Whitney U test: U = 29, P = 0.9). There was a
double dissociation between the two types of confabulations
(Fig. 1): Two spontaneous confabulators' (Patients 1 and 3)
production of provoked confabulations was in the normal
range, while several patients, who did not spontaneously
confabulate (in particular, Patients 12, 15 and 16), produced
massive provoked confabulations. These findings indicate
that spontaneous and provoked confabulations are separate
disorders rather than different degrees of the same disorder.
For subsequent analyses, spontaneous confabulators and the
other amnestic subjects were treated as distinct groups.
Filling gaps in memory (Experiment 1)
The three groups did not significantly differ from each other
in their tendency to fill the type of memory gap examined
in this experiment. Twelve controls answered 0.8±1.03
(median 0.5, range 0-3) fake questions, the spontaneous
confabulators 3.2±3.9 (median 1, range 0-8) and the other
amnesic subjects 1.1 ±2.0 (median 0, range 0-6; Kruskal-
Wallis test, //(2) =1.2, P = 0.50). Only three patients (two
spontaneous confabulators, Patients 3 and 4; one other
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Fig. 2 Performance in the three continuous recognition tests
(Experiment 2). Recognition scores are calculated as: hits-false
positive alarms.
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Fig. 3 Temporal order recognition failure (Experiment 3)
measured as the increase of the relative number of false positives
in the second run of the meaningful designs recognition test used
in Experiment 2, i.e. (FP2/hits2) - (FP|/hits,) with FPj 2 = false
positive alarms in run,
 2 and hitS| 2 = true positive alarms (hits) in
run12.
amnesic patient, Number 16) answered more fake questions
than any control subject. Two spontaneous confabulators
(Patients 2 and 6) and seven other amnesic subjects did not
answer any fake question. Provoked confabulations did not
significantly correlate with the number of answered fake
questions (Spearman rank correlation p =0.16, P = 0.27).
These findings indicate that a desire to indiscriminately fill
gaps in memory is not a common mechanism of either type
of confabulation.
Information storage failure (Experiment 2)
Figure 2 summarizes the result demonstrating that (i)
none of the three recognition tests distinguished between
spontaneous confabulators and the other amnesic subjects
(meaningful designs, U = 22, P = 0.7; nonsense designs,
U = 25, P = 0.6; nonwords, U = 26, P = 0.6); (ii) several
amnesic patients, including some spontaneous confabulators,
performed in the normal range, i.e. mean ±1 SD of the
controls and (iii) spontaneous confabulators' performance
was not, as hypothesized, more selectively impaired with
meaningful than with meaningless stimuli (Fig. 2).
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None of the recognition tasks significantly correlated
with provoked confabulations (Spearman rank correlation:
meaningful designs, p = 0.25, P = 0.35; nonsense designs,
p = 0.22, /> = 0.40; nonwords, p = 0.31, P = 0.23).
Provoked confabulations also did not significantly correlate
with false-positive alarms in the recognition tasks (meaningful
designs, p = 0.21, P = 0.45; nonsense designs, p = -0.02,
P = 0.9; nonwords, p = 0.12, P = 0.65). These results
indicate that neither the occurrence, nor the severity, nor the
type of confabulations depend on the severity of the failure
to store new information as reflected by the performance in
continuous recognition tasks.
Temporal order recognition failure
(Experiment 3)
Figure 3 shows that this task clearly differentiated between
spontaneous confabulators and all other test subjects
(Kruskall-Wallis test: H= 11.7, P = 0.003): spontaneous
confabulators had a higher increase of relative false-
positives indicating failed temporal order recognition than
both the 'other amnesic patients' (Mann-Whitney U test:
U = 0,P = 0.002) and the controls (U = 0, P = 0.002), while
amnesic patients who did not spontaneously confabulate, did
not differ from control subjects (U = 44, /> = 0.65). Although
we did not test the correlation between the severity of the
temporal order recognition failure and spontaneous
confabulations (since spontaneous confabulations were not
quantified), the result perfectly mirrors our clinical impression:
the most severe spontaneous confabulators (Patients 1, 2 and
3) also had the highest increase of false positive responses in
the second run, whereas the patient who just qualified as a
spontaneous confabulator due to very occasional spontaneous
confabulations (Patient 6) performed close to the other amnesic
patients. Patient 4 (initial case) was not available when this
experiment was devised but her failure to recognize the
temporal order of stored information was demonstrated with
a paradigm used by previous investigators (Squire et al.,
1981; Hurst and Volpe, 1982; Parkin and Hunkin, 1993):
when presented with word pairs containing one word from
a list she had learned 1 h before and another word from a
list she had learned 2 h before, she completely failed to
decide which word she had learned first. But she recognized
these words among a series of distracters (Schnider et al.,
1996).
Provoked confabulations did not significantly correlate with
the temporal order recognition failure (p = -0.20, P = 0.45).
Associations with the CVLT
Experiment 2 measured pure item storage. However, memory
entails other components, e.g. a search in memory and
retrieval of stored information. In order to account for
memory functions in a broader sense than determined with
Experiment 2, the association of confabulations with the
performance in the CVLT was analysed. Spontaneous
confabulators did not differ from the other amnesic patients
on any of the analysed measures (Mann-Whitney U test,
P > 0.2), i.e. total number of recalled words in the five
learning trials, recall in the fifth learning trial, short-delay
free recall, long-delay free recall, and long-delay recognition
(hits - false positives).
In contrast, provoked confabulations significantly
correlated with the recall in the fifth learning trial (p = 0.50,
P = 0.05), long-delay free recall (p = 0.76, P = 0.005),
and long-delay recognition (hits, p = 0.76, P = 0.005; false
positives, p = -0.61, P = 0.04; hits-false positives, p = 0.72,
P = 0.01). Thus, provoked confabulations are associated with
relatively better performance in the CVLT.
Associations with frontal tasks
Table 1 shows that there was no consistent pattern of frontal
impairment within and between the two patient groups. In
order to test whether confabulations could be accounted for
by the severity of frontal impairment, the association with
the frontal tasks listed in Table 1 was examined, i.e. verbal
fluency (number of correct words, number of perseverative
and rule break errors; Thurstone and Thurstone, 1963), design
fluency (number of correct designs, number of perseverative
and rule break errors; Regard et al., 1982), and Stroop
colour-word interference (time in the interference run, errors
in the interference run; Stroop, 1935).
Spontaneous confabulators did not significantly differ from
the other amnesic subjects on any of these measures (P > 0.5
for all differences).
Provoked confabulations significantly correlated with the
number of correct words produced in the verbal fluency task
(p = 0.51, P = 0.048). No other significant correlations were
present (design fluency: p = 0.46, P = 0.09; all other
parameters: I p I < 0.2, P > 0.4). Because this result was
entirely unexpected from the literature, in which it is
suggested that frontal dysfunction gives rise to confabulations
(Mercer et al., 1977; Stuss et al., 1978; Shapiro et al., 1981;
Kopelman, 1987; DeLuca, 1993; Fischer et al., 1995), results
from 12 additional patients (including one spontaneous
confabulator) with a long-delay free recall =£4 in the CVLT
were included in the analysis. The correlation remained
significant: intrusions correlated significantly only with the
correct number of words produced in the verbal fluency task
(p = 0.56, P = 0.01), not with the other measures (P > 0.1).
Thus, among this population of amnesic subjects with frontal
dysfunction, provoked confabulations were associated with
relatively intact verbal fluency. No significant correlation
between provoked confabulations and impaired frontal
functions was found.
Because both verbal fluency and recall in the CVLT require
an active search in memory, correlations with the CVLT were
examined. Verbal fluency significantly correlated with the
number of words recalled in the five learning trials (p =
0.59, P = 0.02), the fifth learning trial (p = 0.70, P = 0.008),
1372 A. Sclmicleret al.
and long-delay free recall (p = 0.58, P = 0.03), but not with
measures of recognition. No other significant correlations
were present.
Discussion
Our study reveals that spontaneous and provoked confabula-
tions are different disorders with different mechanisms.
Several authors suggested that spontaneous confabulations
represent a severer degree of the same disorder as provoked
confabulations (Kapur and Coughlan, 1980; DeLuca and
Cicerone, 1991; Dalla Barba, 1993; Fischer et al., 1995).
The definitions of spontaneous confabulations applied in these
studies included features like 'spectacular false memories'
(Fischer et al., 1995) or presumed that spontaneous con-
fabulations were more severe than provoked confabulations
(DeLuca and Cicerone, 1991; Dalla Barba, 1993). We
distinguished between confabulations solely with regard to
their being spontaneous or provoked without assuming any
other qualifying feature. A patient was classified as a 'spontan-
eous confabulator' if he ever acted according to his confabula-
tions, while provoked confabulations were measured as the
total number of intrusions in the CVLT (Delis et al., 1987).
According to these criteria, spontaneous confabulators did
not produce more provoked confabulations than other
amnesic subjects, indicating that spontaneous confabulations
are not simply 'more severe' than provoked confabulations.
We found a double dissociation between spontaneous and
provoked confabulations (Fig. 1): two spontaneous con-
fabulators did not produce abnormal amounts of provoked
confabulations and three of the five patients who produced
the highest number of provoked confabulations did not
spontaneously confabulate. Finally, the failure to recognize
the temporal order of stored information (Experiment 3)
clearly differentiated between spontaneous confabulators and
other amnesic subjects but had no predictive value for
provoked confabulations. These findings indicate that pro-
voked and spontaneous confabulations are separate disorders
that do not share a common mechanism.
Confabulations have been interpreted as representing a
desire to 'fill gaps in memory', assuming that patients
with memory impairment would fabricate a story to protect
themselves from possible embarrassment (Van der Horst,
1932; American Psychiatric Association, 1994). We supposed
that if confabulating patients did, in fact, have an abnormal
tendency to fill gaps in memory, they should do so irrespective
of the type of memory gap they experience. To test this, we
devised a questionnaire containing questions about true items
and fake questions about items that do not exist (Experiment
1); for the latter questions subjects had a mandatory 'gap in
memory'. Our patients, including the spontaneous
confabulators, did not answers significantly more fake
questions than the controls, and provoked confabulations did
not correlate with the number of answered fake questions.
These results are in agreement with Mercer et al. (1977).
They asked confabulating patients questions to which the
patients had not known the answer in a previous session.
This time, however, the examiners suggested to the patients
that they had actually given an answer. They found that the
tendency to produce an answer to these questions was not
associated with the degree of confabulations. Our findings
indicate that neither spontaneous nor provoked confabulations
are associated with an indiscriminate tendency to fill gaps
in memory.
Do confabulating patients actually have a gap in memory?
Do they fail to store information? The performance of our
initial patient (Patient 4) indicated that the amnesia associated
with confabulations does not necessarily reflect deficient
information storage; she performed normally in Sturm and
Willmes's (1995) verbal and non-verbal learning tests
(Schnider et al., 1996). The demands imposed by these
continuous recognition tasks are far beyond the capacity
of the short-term memory (on average 20 items between
subsequent presentations of a target item) and thus depend
on long-term memory (Sturm and Willmes, 1995). Previous
studies demonstrated normal performance of amnesic patients
in some recognition tasks (Squire et al., 1981; Hurst and
Volpe, 1982; Squire and Shimamura, 1986; Parkin, 1992). It
was suggested that the amnesic syndrome may not be
appropriately characterized as a failure of registration or
consolidation but may be based on an inability to suppress
previous events, i.e. a failure of temporal order knowledge
(Warrington and Weiskrantz, 1970; Hurst and Volpe, 1982;
Parkin, 1992). Although continuous recognition tasks as used
in our Experiment 2 may not measure the severity of amnesia
appropriately (Squire and Shimamura, 1986), they may be
the best measure of pure item information storage. We
used three continuous recognition tasks to test whether
confabulations were dependent on a failure to store
information (Experiment 2). We found that performance in
these tests did not have any predictive value for either type
of confabulation: the spontaneous confabulators' performance
was similar to the other amnesic patients; provoked
confabulations did not correlate with the performance in
these tests; some confabulating subjects, including some
spontaneous confabulators, performed in the normal range.
These findings indicate that confabulating patients need not
fail to store new information; they need not have a 'gap in
memory'.
The most tempting hypothesis was that all confabulations
were based on a failure to recognize the temporal order of
stored information. This mechanism was proposed by Van
der Horst (1932) to explain spontaneous confabulations. We
previously found deficient recognition of the temporal order
of information acquisition in a case study of the initial patient
of this series (Patient 4). In that study we used a temporal
order recognition task described by earlier investigators
(Squire et al., 1981; Hurst and Volpe, 1982; Parkin and
Hunkin, 1993): the patient was requested to indicate explicitly
which of two words she had learned earlier that day. However,
such an experiment hardly reflects the automatic temporal
discriminations that constantly occur in memory; we rarely
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have to make conscious temporal discriminations. Experiment
3 tested the capacity to distinguish between separate events
without explicit recollection of the temporal relation between
them. Failure in this experiment was determined by active
misjudgement (false-positive alarms) and indicated two
things: (i) the subject did actually store information (the lag
between the two test runs was 1 h); (ii) the subject failed to
discriminate between temporally distinct presentations of
information. We found that spontaneous confabulators, but
not other amnesic subjects, failed to recognize the temporal
order of stored information (Fig. 3). Conversely, provoked
confabulations did not correlate with the temporal order
recognition failure.
The results described so far do not disclose a mechanism
for provoked confabulations: they do not appear to indicate
a general tendency to fill gaps in memory (Experiment 1)
and are not dependent on a failure to store information
(Experiment 2) or to recognize the temporal order of stored
information (Experiment 3). Contrary to our expectations
(Mercer et al., 1977; Stuss et al., 1978; Shapiro et al., 1981;
Kopelman, 1987; DeLuca, 1993; Fischer et al., 1995), we
found that provoked confabulations positively correlated with
relatively better verbal fluency and performance in the CVLT.
Does this result indicate that relative preservation of memory
and frontal functions are risk factors for provoked
confabulations? This interpretation is implausible because it
predicts that healthy subjects would produce the highest
number of provoked confabulations. Both recall in a memory
test and verbal fluency tasks demand an active search in
memory. We suggest that provoked confabulations result
from an amnesic subject's broad search in his deficient
memory and are the trade-off for increased item recollection.
Our study does not reveal the mechanism of this behaviour.
We observed several times, however, that some amnesic
patients produced provoked confabulations only in the initial
memory tests, while others started to confabulate only after
several months, an observation indicating that provoked
confabulations may reflect a normal strategy to compensate
for deficient memory rather than a stable psychopathological
condition.
Our results do not support the idea of a causal link between
confabulations and frontal executive failures (Stuss et al.,
1978; Kapur et al., 1980; Shapiro et al., 1981; Kopelman,
1987; DeLuca, 1993; Fischer et al., 1995). Although most
of our patients failed on several measures of frontal function,
the pattern of impairments was heterogeneous (Table 1).
Spontaneous confabulators did not differ from the other
amnesic subjects on measures of frontal dysfunction. Previous
studies postulating such a link did not define the types of
confabulations as strictly as we did and were often limited
to a single aetiology, usually haemorrhage from an anterior
communicating artery aneurysm (Kapur et al., 1980; DeLuca
and Cicerone, 1991; DeLuca, 1993; Fischer et al., 1995).
They may thus have described variations of this particular
disorder rather than variations of confabulations. Furthermore,
the use of a composite 'frontal score' (Fischer et al., 1995)
may be appropriate to describe different degrees of a particular
disorder but it risks concealing the specific cognitive
components associated with confabulations.
Convergent evidence indicates that spontaneous confabula-
tions are based on a specific frontal dysfunction, which is
distinct from the commonly known executive failures,
(i) Failed temporal order discrimination in memory, the type
of impairment which sets our spontaneously confabulating
patients apart from the other amnesic subjects (Experiment
3), was previously demonstrated in patients with prefrontal
lesions (Milner et al, 1985; Shimamura et al., 1991) and
damage of the main relay station to this area, the dorsomedial
thalamic nucleus (Shimamura and Squire, 1987; Hunkin and
Parkin, 1993; Parkin et al., 1994). These studies did not
include patients with severe amnesia after orbitofrontal and
basal forebrain lesions and described subtle deficits which
were not associated with confabulations, (ii) Spontaneous
confabulations have been reported in patients with orbito-
frontal and basal forebrain damage (Alexander and Freedman,
1984; Damasio et al., 1985; DeLuca and Cicerone, 1991;
DeLuca, 1993) and lesions of the dorsomedial thalamic
nucleus (Gentilini et al., 1987; Victor et al., 1989). In none
of these patients was memory for the temporal order of
events tested, however. Our Patient 4 suffered an isolated
infarct of the right inferior capsular genu, a lesion dis-
connecting the dorsomedial nucleus from the orbitofrontal
cortex as evident from severe atrophy of the anterior limb
of the internal capsule revealed in the MRI. Two spontaneous
confabulators (Patients 1 and 6) had focal orbitofrontal
damage. We have previously suggested that temporal order
recognition failure and confabulations are based on interrup-
tion of the loop connecting the orbitofrontal cortex directly
and indirectly via the dorsomedial nucleus with the amyg-
dala (Schnider et al., 1996). In any instance, the available
data indicate that spontaneous confabulations require damage
or disconnection of prefrontal, probably orbitofrontal, areas
and have an anatomical substrate that is clearly different
from the amnesia ensuing from hippocampal lesions (Squire,
1992), which is characterized by severely deficient recogni-
tion and is not associated with spontaneous confabulations
(Schnider et al., 1994, 1995).
In conclusion, our study demonstrates that provoked and
spontaneous confabulations are different disorders with
different mechanisms. Provoked confabulations may be an
amnesic patient's trade-off for increased recollection of
information from his deficient memory. In contrast,
spontaneous confabulations appear to be based on a failure
to recognize the temporal order of stored information. It is
conceivable that this disturbance leads to recollection of
elements of memory that do not belong together, hence
the production of false memories. Because spontaneous
confabulations reflect a confusion of memory traces from
diverse events rather than a lack of traces, they are not
associated with a feeling of deficient memory. Patients thus
behave on the basis of these erroneously composed memories
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just as healthy subjects' behaviour is guided by their correctly
composed memories.
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